Price Discrimination Markets Lead Antitrust Enforcers to Increased Success

By Jon B. Dubrow and Ryan Leske on October 4, 2016

Posted In Mergers & Acquisitions, Uncategorized

In the last two years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) brought, and won, several litigated merger cases by establishing narrow markets comprised of a subset of customers for a product. This narrow market theory, known as price discrimination market definition, allowed the agencies to allege markets in which the merging parties faced few rivals and, therefore, estimate high post-merger market shares.

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Tags: Mergers & Acquisitions, Uncategorized

Jon B. Dubrow
Jon B. Dubrow assists clients across a host of inter-related antitrust issues, including mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions / merger clearance, counseling and litigation. Jon leads the defense of mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures before the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission and foreign competition authorities. He also regularly assists third parties whose interests are adversely affected by proposed transactions. Jon also is experienced in antitrust litigation. He provides counseling on distribution issues, contracting arrangements and a wide variety of other competition-related matters. Read Jon Dubrow's full bio.

Ryan Leske
Ryan Leske focuses his practice on defending mergers and acquisitions before the Federal Trade Commission, Department of Justice, state antitrust authorities and foreign competition authorities. His practice also includes complex antitrust litigation and government investigations. Ryan has experience in a variety of industries, including health care, aerospace and defense, agribusiness, alcohol beverages, oil and gas, and metals. Read Ryan Leske's full bio.

Price Discrimination Markets Lead Antitrust Enforcers to Increased Success

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